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A TALE OF TWO (OCCUPIED) CITIES: POLICING STRATEGIES AT OCCUPY 
WALL STREET AND OCCUPY PHILADELPHIA 
TRACI YODER* 
 
New York City - October 1, 2011 
I’m standing on the walkway of the Brooklyn Bridge, peering down and trying to get a 
better glimpse of the scene unfolding beneath me.  Hundreds of people are gathered below.  From 
each direction, lines of police advance.  “They’re going to mass arrest them,” shout many of the 
hundreds watching from above.  Helplessly, we gaze down as our fellow demonstrators are cuffed 
and carried away.  The mood on the walkway is tense.  Assessing our situation, it becomes 
obvious that we too are trapped.  The cables of the bridge suddenly look a lot like a cage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eventually, a friend and I start walking toward the Brooklyn side of the bridge.  The 
crowd thins considerably, and it looks like we will be allowed to leave.  We meet up with a 
hundred other people in a Brooklyn park—a mere fraction of the thousands that had set off from 
Zuccotti Park hours before.  It starts to rain.  As more people trickle into the park, an impromptu 
general assembly is called to decide on next steps.  In the fifteen minutes I sit listening, police 
begin encircling the area.  My friend and I head back to Zuccotti to regroup and gather word 
                                                          
* Traci Yoder is currently the Student Organizer and Researcher/Writer for the National Lawyers Guild in NYC. She is 
also the NLG Legal Worker Vice-President and has worked as Coordinator for the Philadelphia NLG Chapter. She holds a 
MA in Anthropology, a MS in Library Studies, and has participated in mass defense of protestors since 2003. Thanks to 
AK Thompson, Kris Hermes, Jessica Cunningham, Matthew Dineen, Ben Webster, Alexis Larson, Steckley Lee, Angus 
Love, Roy Zipris, and Jonathan Farbowitz for providing commentary and feedback on this piece. 
Figure 1: NYPD surround and mass arrest Occupy Wall Street protestors 
on the Brooklyn Bridge.  Photo courtesy of Brennan Cavanaugh (Flickr 
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License).   
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about those arrested. 
We soon learn that more than seven hundred people were arrested on the bridge.  
Articles and videos of the scene begin to circulate at high speed over the internet and by mobile 
phone.  My friend and I return to Philadelphia the next day, where plans for a local occupation 
are soon underway.  Over the next week, dozens—and then hundreds—of Occupy encampments 
and demonstrations emerge across the country.  Each demands redress to the social and 
economic inequalities created by the 1%. 
 
Philadelphia- November 18, 2011 
Six weeks have passed since my experience on the Brooklyn Bridge, and I’m legal 
observing1 for a demonstration involving civil disobedience taking place outside a major bank in 
Philadelphia.  Approximately fifty Occupy Philly activists watch through the large bank windows 
as nine protestors sit down in the lobby after reading a statement indicting the bank for its role in 
the recent foreclosure crisis.  It’s a cold day, and my hands are freezing as I try to scribble notes.  
Several Civil Affairs2 officers talk to the protestors inside, who indicate that they’re not planning 
to leave.  Outside, supporters use a megaphone to share negative experiences with the bank and 
its predatory lending practices. 
 
                                                          
1
Legal observers monitor law enforcement activities at rallies and marches to create a safer atmosphere for 
protestors to express their political views without unconstitutional disruption or interference by police.  The program 
began in New York City in 1968, and the term “legal observer” has been copyrighted by the National Lawyers Guild. See 
Legal Observer Program, NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, http://www.nlg.org/resources/legal-observing/ (last visited May 
31, 2012). 
2
The Philadelphia Police Department’s Civil Affairs Division is the branch of law enforcement that has 
primary responsibilities at any public assembly, demonstration, or labor dispute in the city. See Press Release, American 
Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, ACLU Announces Settlement with Philadelphia Police Department over Arrest of 
Protestor (Jan. 12, 2009), available at http://www.aclupa.org/pressroom/acluannouncessettlementwit.htm (describing the 
settlement agreement for the arrest of protestor Marianne Bessey and the role of the Philadelphia Police Department’s 
Civil Affairs Division). The ACLU of Pennsylvania reached a settlement with the Civil Affairs Division in 2009 that 
requires additional free speech and First Amendment training for its officers. See Mary Catherine Roper, Bessey v. City of 
Philadelphia, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF PENNSYLVANIA,  http://www.aclupa.org/legal/legaldocket/ 
protestorarrestedoutsideof  (last visited May 31, 2012) (describing the events that led to Marianne Bessey’s arrest by two 
Philadelphia police officers). 
Figures 2 & 3: Formation of Bicycle Police and Highway Patrolmen at an Occupy Philly bank demonstration.  
Photos courtesy of Dave Onion.  Used with permission. 
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Police reinforcements begin to arrive.  A group of twenty bicycle cops form a barricade 
between the bank windows and the demonstrators outside.  Next, a line of twenty highway patrol 
officers dressed in high boots and wielding batons form a line behind the bike cops.  As has 
become standard, an officer inside videotapes the scene with a large camera.3  As I write this all 
down, another legal observer taps my shoulder and points behind us.  Police begin forming a 
circle around the small group of activists outside.  Squadrons of bike police are stationed at each 
entrance.  Police cars line the street behind us.  At least one hundred cops are in the plaza and 
more are stationed close by.  We are surrounded. 
Inside, the police slowly begin arresting the demonstrators and taking them to a back 
room where we can no longer see them.  After forty-five minutes, the police push the outside 
protestors back and use their bikes to form a corridor from the bank to the street.  At this point, a 
demonstrator suddenly falls to the ground, convulsing from a seizure.  Cries for medics produce 
an activist from Occupy Philly Medics, who works with the police to stabilize the man. The entire 
plaza becomes eerily silent as we wait for an ambulance to arrive.  As soon as the ambulance 
drives away, the arrests continue.  Police bring out the protestors one by one, and the crowd 
cheers as each walks proudly from the door to the waiting police vans.  When the arrests are 
over, the remaining protestors and legal observers walk down Market Street back to City Hall.  
Bicycle police and a Civil Affairs Unit escort us the whole way.  After reaching the encampment, 
protestors begin preparing for jail solidarity while the remaining police return to their positions 
surrounding the plaza. 
INTRODUCTION 
When Occupy Wall Street (OWS) began in September 2011, it reignited popular protest 
in a way not seen in the United States since the anti-war and anti-globalization demonstrations of 
the early 2000’s.  However, unlike popular protests of the last decade, Occupy did not limit itself 
to a day or a week of action.  Rather, occupations had a sense of permanency that posed new 
challenges for demonstrators, police, and city officials.  Not surprisingly, local police departments 
and administrations responded to Occupy in different ways and used a combination of crowd 
control strategies.  The vignettes provided above illustrate two such strategies.  The mass arrests 
on the Brooklyn Bridge were in keeping with the rapid escalation of force used by the NYPD 
against non-violent Occupy protestors.  By comparison, arrests in Philadelphia were far less 
frequent and interactions between occupiers, the city, and the police were (on the surface) fairly 
congenial. 
These different strategies of protest control are referred to as Escalated Force and 
Negotiated Management.4  Participants in anti-globalization demonstrations in the United States 
since 1999 are well acquainted with Escalated Force, a policing model that relies on the kettling5 
                                                          
3
See Dave Lindorff, No News Is Not Good News: If Cops Tape Protests and Journalists and No One 
Reports It, Is It Intimidation?, THIS CAN’T BE HAPPENING (Nov. 19, 2010, 11:20 AM), 
http://www.thiscantbehappening.net/node/306 (discussing the lack of media coverage about the use of cameras by 
Philadelphia Police officials during protests). 
4
See KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA 183-84, 190 (South 
End Press 2007) (describing the crowd control strategies such as escalated force and negotiated management). 
5
Kettling is a police tactic of corralling and trapping protestors into a closed area using nets and police 
cordons.  The crowd is then usually mass arrested.  See Julian Joyce, Police “Kettle” Tactics Feel the Heat, BBC NEWS 
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of protestors, mass arrests, violent dispersals of crowds, and the use of “non-lethal”6 weapons like 
tasers, projectiles, tear gas, and pepper spray.  These tactics have been well documented by 
movement lawyers,7 activist intellectuals,8 and the independent media.  Escalated Force has also 
been used to respond to Occupy in various parts of the country, most visibly in New York City 
and Oakland.  However, it has thus far been more common for movement activists to encounter 
the conciliatory approach known by police strategists as Negotiated Management.  In this model, 
police attempt to create a collaborative relationship with protestors in order to make 
demonstrations predictable and non-disruptive.  Under the Negotiated Management model police 
and city officials work in close collaboration to manage protest through surveillance, permitting, 
constant contact with protestors, and infrequent but strategic arrests.9 
Despite the apparent differences between Escalated Force and Negotiated Management, 
it is crucial to remember that both models share the goal of controlling dissent and thwarting 
efforts to produce social changes.10  With its focus on dialogue and cooperation, Negotiated 
Management may initially appear to benefit protest movements.  However, when considered from 
the standpoint of movement development, public support, and legal defense, I argue that this 
policing strategy is in many ways more effective than Escalated Force in neutralizing social 
justice movements. 
Philadelphia is one of the larger cities in which police and city officials responded to 
Occupy using a Negotiated Management approach.11  Based on my experience as a National 
Lawyers Guild12 coordinator, I offer a first-hand account of how Occupy Philadelphia (OP) 
emerged.  I also describe how police and city administrators orchestrated the eventual eviction of 
protestors from the Occupy Philly encampment at City Hall.  Here, it becomes clear that—even in 
cities like Philadelphia, where the reactions of police and city officials were considered 
                                                          
(Apr. 16, 2009, 2:12 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8000641.stm. 
6
Calling these weapons non-lethal is misleading; projectiles in particular can cause serious injury or even 
death. 
7
See HEIDI BOGHOSIAN, NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, PUNISHING PROTEST: GOVERNMENT TACTICS THAT 
SUPPRESS FREE SPEECH i (2007), available at http://www.nationallawyersguild.org/NLG_Punishing_Protest_2007.pdf 
(“[S]ince the 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle, law enforcement has aggressively used a range of tactics 
to intimidate protestors and to silence lawful expressions of dissent in the United States.”). 
8
See generally DAVID GRAEBER, DIRECT ACTION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY (AK Press 2009) (providing an 
ethnographic study of the global social justice movement, including the use of police tactics during various public 
protests). 
9
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 190. 
10
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 191 (“Negotiated Management was an innovation in the means of crowd 
control, but the basic aim remained unchanged.  Both Negotiated Management and Escalated Force represent a defense of 
the status quo.”). 
11
Many other cities also employed Negotiated Management techniques, including Los Angeles, Toronto, 
and most of the towns and smaller cities where Occupy encampments emerged.  This observation is based on my 
experience organizing legal support for Occupy in smaller towns in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware as well as 
conversations with other Guild attorneys and legal workers across the country. 
12
The National Lawyers Guild is a progressive legal organization founded in 1937.  The Guild unites 
lawyers, law students, and legal workers in order to use the law to advance social justice and support progressive 
movements. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, http://www.nlg.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2012); See also Arun Gupta & 
Michelle Fawcett, Occupy Fights the Law: Will the Law Win? SALON (Feb. 14, 2012, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/topic/national_lawyers_guild/ (describing the role of the National Lawyers Guild in regard to 
Occupy). 
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cooperative—the constant implicit threat of police violence and strict demands around permitting 
and code violations created an environment that stifled dissent, slowed movement growth, and 
deflected attention away from economic inequalities. 
What follows is a comparative ethnographic analysis of the strategies of protest control 
used by police and government officials at Occupy Wall Street and Occupy Philly.  My analysis is 
historically grounded and situates contemporary developments within the shifting strategies of 
protest policing developed and refined over the past century.  At the same time, much of my 
account remains descriptive to allow the reader to see how these models play out on the ground.13  
In conclusion, I suggest how radical lawyers and legal workers might help protestors better 
navigate the traps of Negotiated Management as they also support activists confronting Escalated 
Force strategies. 
I. HISTORY OF PROTEST POLICING STRATEGIES 
Understanding Occupy requires that we situate the movement within the larger context 
of America’s history of police repression and criminalization of dissent.  Over the past century, 
police strategists have created various crowd control models to suppress protests, strikes, and 
demonstrations.  Here I focus on the broad shifts that have occurred in police strategies for 
preventing, dispersing, and controlling demonstrations.  Outlining transformations in protest 
policing over the past 150 years, Kristian Williams highlights four overlapping approaches of 
Maximum Force, Show of Force, Escalated Force, and Negotiated Management.14  Although all 
of these models still find expression in the tactics used against contemporary social movements, 
Escalated Force and Negotiated Management have been the two most common strategies for the 
past seventy years. 
Prior to WWI, the dominant approach to neutralizing protests was based on the doctrine 
referred to by Williams as “Maximum Force.”15  As the name indicates, this model relied on local 
militia and the state to violently disperse demonstrations—preferably before a large crowd could 
gather.  A later variation on this model suggested that the mere show of force could be enough to 
quell potential strikes and uprisings.16  Police thus began staging impressive and even theatrical 
displays of numbers and weaponry, assuming that the threat of extreme violence would suffice to 
keep people in order.  This theory proved false when crowds became even more incensed by the 
blatant displays of police aggression.  The “Show of Force” model was therefore generally 
abandoned as police returned to Maximum Force tactics.17 
                                                          
13
These observations were collected primarily through my legal defense work with the National Lawyers 
Guild of Philadelphia, which required that I pay constant attention to the ways that police and government monitored, 
intervened, or disrupted people engaging in protected First Amendment activities.  Additionally, the first-hand accounts in 
this article are based on my engagement with Occupy Wall Street and Occupy Philly, including attending meetings and 
demonstrations, reading listserv conversations, and spending time at the encampments.  When possible, my observations 
are supported by official statements, mainstream and independent media sources, and documents produced by the City of 
Philadelphia and Occupy Philly.  When no other source is indicated, the information comes directly from my observations 
and notes. 
14
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 183, 189-90 (discussing the use of these techniques across time). 
15
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 180 (discussing the use of the “Maximum Force” strategy during the late 
19th century). 
16
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 181 (discussing the “Show of Force” strategy). 
17
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 181-84 (discussing how the presumption that a large police presence did 
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In the early twentieth century, protest policing slowly began to shift to a more flexible 
model known as “Escalated Force.”18  Also referred to as “Sequence of Force” or “Flexible 
Response,” this approach called for police to constantly assess the potential threat of the crowd 
and escalate their level of violence accordingly.  The model has seven steps of escalation and 
incorporates aspects of both the Maximum Force and Show of Force doctrines.  The Escalated 
Force continuum includes the following steps: 1) Police presence, 2) Display of power, 3) 
Commands, 4) Arrests, 5) Batons, 6) Less-lethal munitions, and finally 7) Firearms.19 
Escalated Force depends on a disciplined and militarized police force capable of 
adapting to quickly changing situations and maintaining order within their own ranks.  In practice, 
this approach has generally resulted in preemptive violence against demonstrators and a quick 
escalation of force that has done little to restore order.  By the 1970s, these shortcomings were 
becoming increasingly clear.  In response, several commissions were convened to draft 
recommendations to address police violence at anti-war demonstrations during the 1960s. The 
three major commissions (Kerner, Eisenhower, and Scranton) all found that the escalation of 
police violence against demonstrators only increased civil disorder and provoked further dissent.20 
From their recommendations, the strategy of “Negotiated Management” emerged.  Throughout 
the ‘70s, ‘80s, and ‘90s, it became the preferred method of controlling protests.  Negotiated 
Management shifts the focus from dispersing demonstrations to containing and controlling them 
through a variety of tactics, including permitting, delimiting free speech “zones,” and convincing 
demonstrators to cooperate with police in planning marches and gatherings.21  This more “liberal” 
approach to managing dissent relies on a positive approach to First Amendment rights, increased 
police tolerance for disruption and civil disobedience, communication and cooperation between 
protestors and police, selective and strategic arrests, and minimal physical force.22 
Uprisings against the neoliberal economic policies of international monetary 
organizations at the beginning of the twenty-first century witnessed a return to escalated and 
preemptive force.23  Beginning in Seattle in 1999 and continuing today, anti-summit 
demonstrators have increasingly been subjected to pre-emptive raids and attacks with “less-lethal” 
munitions like pepper spray, rubber bullets, bean bag rounds, tasers, tear gas, and batons.24  The 
model for controlling anti-globalization protests was implemented at the Republican National 
Convention in 2000 in Philadelphia where, under Commissioner John Timoney, state and local 
police infiltrated activist groups, raided convergence centers and the puppet warehouse, and 
                                                          
not prevent confrontation but was provocative). 
18
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 182-83. 
19
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 182-84 (discussing the “Escalated Force” progressive display of force). 
20
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 189-91. 
21
Clark McPhail et al., Policing Protest in the United States: 1960-1995, in POLICING PROTEST: THE 
CONTROL OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 55-57 (Donatella Della Porta & Herbert Reiter eds., 
1998). 
22
Id. at 53. 
23
The Seattle protests against the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 1999 were notable for 
both the large numbers of people involved and the increased use of militant and direct action tactics, which led to a more 
repressive response from police and government officials. Increased use of Escalated Force tactics corresponded to the 
increasing militarization of police departments in the United States, a trend that accelerated after 9/11. See generally 
CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS (Verso Press 2008) (discussing 
the militarization of American police departments). 
24
BOGHOSIAN, supra note 7, at i. 
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violently attacked protestors, arresting 420 in total.25  In 2002, Timoney became police chief of 
Miami and went on to preside over even more violent attacks on protestors that took place at 
demonstrations against the Free Trade Area of the Americas summit in 2003.26  Along with the 
increased use of military style weapons against demonstrators, Timoney’s Escalated Force tactics 
included pre-emptive raids and arrests.27  Known as the “Miami Model,”28 this repertoire of 
repression is still very evident at anti-summit protests today.  While the Miami Model may seem 
like a new development after decades of negotiated management policies, these strategies actually 
represent a return to tactics that have long been used to control political protests in the United 
States. 
I have provided this historical outline in order to 
elucidate the ways in which each of these models find 
expression today.  Aspects of all four general models are 
used against contemporary protestors, with Show of 
Force reintegrated as the first stage of Escalated Force, 
and Maximum Force still a very real possibility.  While I 
have described these as four different frameworks for the 
purposes of conceptual clarity, they are in fact all part of 
the toolbox of tactics used to police protests.  Escalated 
Force and Negotiated Management can also be used in 
tandem to create a more systematic version of the good 
cop/bad cop dynamic.  In the case of a national 
movement like Occupy, local police did not even need to 
threaten violence against protestors, since evidence of 
police brutality in other cities already provided the 
necessary intimidation to coerce many protestors into 
playing by the rules. 
II. OCCUPY WALL STREET 
Occupy Wall Street began September 17, 2011, 
following a call by the Canadian media group Adbusters 
                                                          
25
The events and arrests of the 2000 Republican National Convention in Philadelphia have been 
documented by the R2K Legal Collective.  See Defend the RNC 420: Breaking News Archive, R2K LEGAL COLLECTIVE, 
http://r2klegal.protestarchive.org/r2klegal/stats.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2012). 
26
Today, Timoney continues to spread his model of Escalated Force to respond to protests, most recently in 
Bahrain.  See Ryan Devereaux, John Timoney: The notorious police chief sent to reform forces in Bahrain, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/16/john-timoney-police-chief-bahrain-
protests?newsfeed=true (discussing John Timoney’s “reputation for cracking down on protests as police chief in Miami 
and Philadelphia”). 
27
Jeremy Scahill, The Miami Model: Paramilitaries, Embedded Journalists, and Illegal Protests. Think this 
is Iraq? It’s your Country, INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE, (Nov. 24, 2003), 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5286.htm. 
28
The term “Miami model” was first used by Miami Mayor Manny Diaz, who referred to the police 
response to the protests during the Free Trade Area of the Americas Miami meeting in 2003 as a “model for homeland 
security.”  Id. 
Figure 4: Initial Occupy Wall Street 
poster circulated throughout the summer 
of 2011.  Courtesy of Adbusters. 
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earlier that summer.29  Originally planning to occupy 1 Chase Plaza, organizers were deterred 
when police showed up ahead of time to fence off the area.  In response, activists chose Zuccotti 
Park, a private park nearby, as the occupation site.30  It became the epicenter of the Occupy 
movement. 
My engagement with Occupy Wall Street began the weekend of the arrests on the 
Brooklyn Bridge, when I traveled to Manhattan to witness this quickly growing phenomenon and 
ended up watching the mass arrest of Occupy Wall Street demonstrators.  Mass arrests are a 
standard part of the policing strategy that relies on Escalated Force.  They are designed to 
neutralize a large portion of the protest, present a threatening spectacle for those watching and 
recording nearby, criminalize acts of dissent, and remind demonstrators of the risks associated 
with taking part in protests that challenge the social and economic structures of this country.  
Mass arrests are not a new tactic for the NYPD; they have been used for years as a way to shut 
down NYC protests, as seen during the Republican National Convention in 200431 and the Critical 
Mass bike rides.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of Occupy Wall Street, this strategy backfired.  Combined with other 
emerging evidence of police brutality against Occupy Wall Street protestors, the highly visible 
mass arrests of a peaceful demonstration only served to galvanize and expand the movement.  The 
first few weeks of the occupation of Zuccotti Park had been largely ignored by the mainstream 
                                                          
29
Justin Elliott, The Origins of Occupy Wall Street Explained, SALON (Oct. 4, 2012, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2011/10/04/adbusters_occupy_wall_st/ (“In July Adbusters, a Vancouver-based publication . . . 
included a poster in that month’s magazine that read simply: #OCCUPYWALLSTREET September17th.  Bring Tent...”). 
30
WRITERS FOR THE 99%, OCCUPYING WALL STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF AN ACTION THAT CHANGED 
AMERICA, 12-13 (Haymarket Books 2012) (describing the events lower Manhattan leading up to the September 17th, 2011 
occupation of Zuccotti Park). 
31
Over 1,800 people were mass arrested during the Republican National Convention in 2004.  Hundreds 
were also arrested at a Critical Mass ride the previous week, an attempt to intimidate protestors planning to take part in the 
RNC2004 demonstrations.  NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REPORT: RIGHTS AND WRONGS AT THE RNC 1 (2005), 
available at http://www.nyclu.org/node/1039. 
32
BOGHOSIAN, supra note 7, at 65 (Providing a further discussion of mass arrests in relation to protests and 
Critical Mass); see also Alex Vitale, NYPD and OWS: A Clash of Styles, in OCCUPY!: SCENES FROM OCCUPIED AMERICA 
74-81(Carla Blumenkranz et al. eds., Verso 2011) (analyzing the tactics of the NYPD). 
Figure 5: NYPD arrest protestor after kettling off a 
section of the sidewalk in New York City.  Photo 
courtesy of Paul Weiskel (Flickr CC). 
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media.33  However, when the NYPD began to take extreme measures against protestors, it brought 
attention to the protest and provoked outrage across the country.  On September 24th, more than 
80 people were arrested during a peaceful march to Union Square.34  Many were forcibly detained 
while standing and walking on sidewalks.35  When NYPD Deputy Inspector Anthony Bologna 
pepper sprayed four young women who had been kettled, the video went viral and led to shock 
and indignation.36  The day before the Brooklyn Bridge arrests, I joined thousands of others on a 
march to the NYPD headquarters to demand the resignation of NYPD Police Commissioner Ray 
Kelly.  Later that week, another planned march in the Financial District led to more than two 
hundred arrests.  Footage of police hitting protestors and journalists, destroying cameras, and 
arbitrarily arresting demonstrators was posted to YouTube and quickly shared via Facebook, 
Twitter, independent media websites, and listservs.  Soon, even corporate media outlets began 
covering the events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It may seem obvious that blatant displays of police brutality against a movement for 
economic justice would be met with nationwide interest.  However, those taking part in mass 
demonstrations in the U.S. know how often protestors are met with police violence.  In many 
cases, lack of mainstream coverage obscures the movement and its message.  Occupy is therefore 
somewhat unique in having produced strong and rapidly growing national and international 
support.  As noted above, the widespread use of social media like Twitter, Facebook, and 
YouTube quickly spread videos and images to people who otherwise may not have taken notice. 
                                                          
33
The lack of attention resulted in only a few thousand people coming out on September 17th, despite 
Adbuster’s call for 20,000 to descend on Wall Street. See Adbusters, #OCCUPYWALLSTREET: A Shift in Revolutionary 
Tactics, ADBUSTERS BLOG (July 13, 2011), http://www.adbusters.org/blogs/adbusters-blog/occupywallstreet.html (calling 
for 20,000 people to “flood into lower Manhattan, set up tents, kitchens, peaceful barricades and occupy Wall Street for a 
few months.”). 
34
Colin Moynihan, 80 Arrested as Financial District Protest Moves North, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24. 2011, 
8:31 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/80-arrested-as-financial-district-protest-moves-north/ (“Protest 
organizers estimated that about 85 people were arrested and that about five were struck with pepper spray.”). 
35
Occupy Wall Street Union Square March and Arrests Photos September 24, 2011, PUBLIC 
INTELLIGENCE, (Sept. 26, 2011), http://publicintelligence.net/occupy-wall-street-union-square-march-and-arrests-photos-
september-24-2011/. 
36
NYPD Anthony Bologna Pepper Sprays Occupy Wall Street Protesters, YOUTUBE (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRc7t6gRkhE. 
Figure 6: Police hold down and arrest protestor 
pulled from the crowd.  Photo courtesy of Paul 
Weiskel (Flickr CC). 
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While the corporate media characterized the movement as lacking a coherent message, Occupy’s 
analysis of banking practices, corporate greed, rising debt, and the ineffectiveness of electoral 
politics resonated with many Americans frustrated by declining economic conditions and by 
President Obama’s inability to follow through on campaign promises.  Finally, the movement’s 
mythic quality (celebrated and promoted by groups like Adbusters and Anonymous)37 cannot be 
underestimated when seeking to explain why people rallied when police attacked peaceful 
demonstrators.  The vibrant park occupation in the heart of the financial district, the concept of a 
99% united to hold the 1% accountable, and the use of participatory practices like the General 
Assembly38 and the “people’s mic” all helped to create a romantic and inspiring picture of 
resistance that was quickly adapted elsewhere.39 
As a result of the well-documented movement in NYC, new occupations began to 
emerge daily.  All were united by their critique of extreme economic inequality, their horizontal 
structure based on directly democratic decision-making, and their reliance on social media to 
spread the word and connect to other locations.  Occupy Wall Street became the movement’s 
keystone, leading by example and holding Zuccotti Park (renamed Liberty Plaza) as a model for 
other occupation sites.40  Although the encampment remained peaceful, the police became a 
constant presence, with uniformed and undercover officers constantly monitoring the park and its 
inhabitants.  In addition to the mass arrests and police violence that took place during marches, 
Occupiers were subjected to constant surveillance and daily harassment at the park itself.41  
Tensions between protestors, the city, and police came to a head on November 15th when 
hundreds of riot cops raided the encampment in the middle of the night.  They arrested more than 
two hundred people42 and destroyed everything in the park—right down to the carefully 
assembled People’s Library.43  Citing health and safety concerns, Mayor Bloomberg defended the 
eviction of the camp: “From the beginning, I have said that the city has two principal goals: 
guaranteeing public health and safety, and guaranteeing the protesters’ First Amendment rights,” 
he said.  “But when those two goals clash, the health and safety of the public and our first 
                                                          
37
Anonymous is a loose coalition of “hactivists” who support Occupy Wall Street and other social justice 
movements.  See Anonymous – Occupy Wall Street, YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=l6jdkpQjueo (displaying an Anonymous video calling for the occupation of Wall Street). 
38
The General Assembly is the participatory consensus-based public meeting the Occupy movement uses 
as its main decision-making body.  General Assemblies differ from place to place, but generally are held daily or several 
times a week to share working groups reports and debate issues central to the movement. See WRITERS FOR THE 99%, 
supra note 30, at 25-32. 
39
For more on the Occupy Wall Street encampment and practices, see generally WRITERS FOR THE 99%, 
supra note 30, (providing first hand accounts of the occupation and maps of the organization of Zucotti Park). 
40
The physical space of the park was divided into areas for food, sign making, a library, media, sleeping, 
and meetings.  Daily General Assemblies were held in the evening and working groups met throughout the day to discuss 
process, direct action, legal, outreach, and more. 
41
For numerous examples of police interference and surveillance at Occupy Wall Street, see OCCUPY!: 
SCENES FROM OCCUPIED AMERICA, supra note 32. 
42
Colleen Long & Verena Dobnik, Zuccotti Park Eviction: Police Arrest 200 Occupy Wall Street 
Protestors, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 2011, 5:04 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/15/zuccotti-park-
eviction-po_n_1094306.html (“Police Commissioner Ray Kelly said around 200 people were arrested.”). 
43
The NYPD seized almost 4,000 books during the eviction.  Karen McVeigh, Destruction of Occupy Wall 
Street ‘People’s Library’ draws ire, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/ 
nov/23/occupy-wall-street-peoples-library. 
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responders must be the priority.”44  In this case, it becomes clear that even when Escalated Force 
is the preferred method of police and city officials, the language of negotiated management can be 
effectively mobilized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The recourse to health and safety violations became a common pretext for the often-
violent evictions of Occupy all over the country.  However, the use of permit and code violations 
to explain the need for escalated force is nothing new.  Police, city officials, and code inspectors 
have a long history of working together to use breaches in fire, safety, and health codes to justify 
violently dispersing occupations, squats, organizing spaces, and convergences centers.45  Police 
were successful in shutting down the occupation at Liberty Plaza; however, by that time, the 
Occupy movement could not be contained to a park in Manhattan.  Occupy Wall Street had 
captured the imaginations of people across the country and around the world, and occupations 
were growing rapidly by the day.46  In each case, occupiers had to contend with different reactions 
from local city officials and police.  As was the case with many other locations, Occupy Philly 
faced no blatant police violence.  However, even in the absence of force, more insidious tactics 
were used to contain the movement and ensure that grievances regarding economic and social 
inequality went unaddressed. 
III. OCCUPY PHILLY 
A. From Wall Street to Market Street 
Planning was already underway for an occupation in Philadelphia the week after the 
Occupy Wall Street arrests on the Brooklyn Bridge.  After two well-attended planning meetings, 
                                                          
44
Long & Dobnik, supra note 42. 
45
AK THOMPSON, BLACK BLOC, WHITE RIOT: ANTI-GLOBALIZATION AND THE GENEALOGY OF DISSENT 68 
(AK Press 2010) (addressing the use of codes to regulate protestor occupations). 
46
Occupy Directory, OCCUPY TOGETHER, http://directory.occupy.net/ (last visited May 8, 2011) (providing 
a directory listing all occupations related to this movement). 
Figure 7: Protestor being arrested. The 
National Lawyers Guild arrest hotline is 
written on her body, a common practice 
enabling demonstrators to access legal 
assistance when arrested.  Photo courtesy of 
Paul Weiskel (Flickr CC).
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demonstrators decided to occupy Dilworth Plaza, a rather bleak square on the west side of City 
Hall in Center City.47  The police and city took immediate action.  The day after the location and 
date were set, the NLG and ACLU received an invitation to attend a meeting with Mayor Michael 
Nutter, who had indicated that he would like to meet with lawyers and legal workers involved 
with Occupy Philly.  The Mayor and his staff48 had numerous questions about Occupy Philly, 
which revealed many of the points of contention that would emerge over the next two months.  
What did Occupy want?  What were its targets?  How was it organized?  Who were the leaders?  
How would they communicate with the city and the police?  Were they planning to get a permit?  
What would they do when they arrived at City Hall?  How would they control the crowd that 
showed up?  What if violence or property destruction occurred?  What if groups who already had 
grievances about the Mayor and his policies took advantage of the movement to press him 
politically?  Where would they go to the bathroom?  Would they be using electricity?  Would they 
damage the plaza?  How would they organize daily meals?  When would they leave?  What would 
they do when the city began planned construction on Dilworth Plaza that winter? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We were unable to answer all of their questions, both because we did not want to speak 
on behalf of Occupy and because we didn’t know exactly what was going to happen when the 
occupation began.  It was uncertain from the outcome of the meeting whether the city would 
respond aggressively if the organizers refused to apply for a permit or if the encampment attracted 
enough attention to be deemed a threat.  We left the Mayor’s office to begin setting up the legal 
defense infrastructure we would need in case there were immediate arrests.  In order to do so, we 
                                                          
47
See Matthew Dineen, More Than A Symbolic Gesture: Occupy Wall Street and the Rise of the American 
Autumn, TOWARDS FREEDOM (Oct. 13, 2011, 4:17 PM), http://www.towardfreedom.com/activism/2579-more-than-a-
symbolic-gesture-occupy-wall-street-and-the-rise-of-the-american-autumn (providing a fuller account of the emergence of 
Occupy Philly). 
48
In addition to the Mayor, the room included the Captain of Civil Affairs William Fisher, Police 
Commissioner Charles Ramsey, Managing Direct Richard Negrin, the Mayor’s Press Secretary, the city’s permit 
supervisor, and a group of aides. 
Figure 8: Close to 1000 people gather at the Arch 
Street Methodist Church for the second planning 
meeting of Occupy Philly.  Courtesy of Occupy Philly 
Media. 
Figure 9: “From Wall Street 
to Market Street”: Poster 
created and circulated in the 
early days of Occupy Philly.  
Courtesy of Occupy Philly 
Media.  
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had to contend with many questions of our own.  What would the police do when the protestors 
showed up at the widely advertised date and time?  How could we set up legal support for a 
permanent occupation in less than forty-eight hours?  How could we prepare for immediate arrests 
if the occupation got forcibly dispersed?  We got to work and spent the next two days assembling 
legal observers, planning legal observer and Know Your Rights (KYR) trainings, gathering KYR 
materials to give to demonstrators, and creating a referral list of attorneys who agreed to represent 
Occupy protestors if they got arrested.  No one knew what to expect. 
B. Occupation: Day 1 
On October 6th, the occupation of City Hall began at 9:00 a.m.  Protestors showed up by 
the hundreds, and numbers swelled to over 1,000 for the first General Assembly at noon.  The 
police also showed up in force.  Large gates and groups of police shut off all openings to the 
center of City Hall, a public area and subway entrance.  Bike cops gathered in clusters or rode the 
perimeter.  Civil Affairs officers in plainclothes wearing bright orange armbands circled the plaza 
and concentrated on the front steps facing the street, where people waved handcrafted signs to the 
enthusiastic honking of passing cars.  Police created a central command site several blocks away, 
and police officers and city officials approached protestors with questions and concerns 
throughout the day.  Soon, a handful of people agreed to act as liaisons between Occupy Philly 
and the police and city.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The assembled crowd was excited and slightly uncertain.  As more people arrived 
throughout the morning, organizers began slowly setting up areas for food, childcare, sign-
making, and tents.  The first General Assembly introduced the new working groups and made 
announcements about plans for the coming days.  The conversation turned to an extended 
discussion of permitting as demonstrators considered the city’s request (fielded by the ACLU) 
that Occupy Philly apply for a permit for Dilworth Plaza.  In an apparent gesture of goodwill, the 
city had offered to waive the filing and insurance fees that normally accompany such applications.  
                                                          
49
The question of who would speak to the city on behalf of Occupy was a question the movement had to 
address early.  The initial police liaisons became an OP working group, which was soon disbanded by the General 
Assembly.  The Occupy Philadelphia Legal Collective (composed of legal activists, lawyers, and law students) was 
assigned the role of communicating with police and city officials for the remainder of the occupation. 
Figure 10: National Lawyers Guild 
lawyer Sarah Coburn legal observing at 
the first OP General Assembly.  Courtesy 
of Occupy Philly Media. 
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They also allowed Occupy Philly to apply for a permit without a specific ending date.  Opinions 
at the General Assembly differed.  While many felt committed to the idea of an occupation that 
did not seek permission, others were willing to take the city’s offer for the sake of expediency. 
Like many subsequent conversations about requests from the city and police, the permit 
question was not resolved in one meeting.  In what follows, I outline the evolving relationship 
between Occupy, the City of Philadelphia, and the Philadelphia Police Department during the two 
months of the occupation.  The approach of the Mayor’s Office and the PPD was a textbook 
application of Negotiated Management techniques.  However, this did not prevent the perceived 
threat of violence from influencing protestors’ decisions and actions.  Nor did the city and 
police’s congenial overtures save the encampment from eventual eviction when the moment was 
politically expedient. 
C. “Part of the 99%”: City and Police Responses to Occupy Philly 
Despite fears of an immediate police crackdown, the early days of Occupy Philly were 
marked mainly by cooperation between occupiers, the city, and the police.  As early as the first 
meeting with legal, Mayor Nutter began referring to himself as “part of the 99%”—a claim that 
many found dubious and suspiciously timed to coincide with his mayoral re-election campaign.  
On one of the first nights of the occupation, the Mayor toured the camp in the late evening to 
shake hands and pose for pictures with those who had set up tents.  While many were skeptical of 
these sound bites and photo-ops, others were genuinely pleased to have such a positive response 
from Philadelphia’s top city official. 
The police were also on their best behavior.  The Civil Affairs Division communicated 
and coordinated marches with Occupy Philadelphia direct action organizers.  They blocked streets 
to allow protestors to pass and had frequent and polite discussions with occupiers about their 
plans.  At the request of Commissioner Ramsey, the First Amendment was read at roll call at the 
beginning of each police shift, and the official stance of the city and police was that protestors’ 
civil rights would not be violated.50  As days went by and no arrests or attacks from police took 
place, many people began to relax.  Others, especially long-time activists who still remembered 
the brutality of Philly police during the Republican National Convention in 2000, warned 
occupiers not to become complacent.  A group put together a pamphlet entitled “The Mayor and 
the Police Are Not Our Friends: A Letter to Occupy Philly” that reminded people that, despite the 
polite face, Mayor Nutter and his higher police officials had a long history of protecting the 1%.51  
Incidents with undercover cops at the encampment and suspicions of police infiltration also 
contributed to organizers’ concerns.  Nevertheless, many Philadelphians congratulated the city 
and police’s gestures of goodwill. 
D. “We Don’t Need a Permit for an Occupation!”: Permitting and Safety Codes 
During the first planning meeting of Occupy Philadelphia, the question of permits came 
                                                          
50
Talk of the Nation: Shifts in Police Tactics to Handle Crowds, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/29/142903638/shifts-in-police-tactics-to-handle-crowds (describing, in an interview with 
Philadelphia police commissioner Charles Ramsey, the evolution of crowd control tactics and the approaches that city 
officials and police took towards Occupy Philadelphia). 
51
The Mayor and the Police Are Not Our Friends: A Letter to Occupy Philly, available at 
http://multi.lectical.net/content/mayor_and_police_are_not_our_friends_letter_occupy_philly (last visited May 8, 2012). 
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up almost immediately.  After a very brief discussion, one young man raised his hand and said, 
“We don’t need a permit for an occupation!”  Cheering in agreement, the assembled crowd moved 
on to consider plans for setting up an occupation encampment.  The permit issue returned almost 
immediately, due to the City’s continued insistence that Occupy Philadelphia apply for a permit.  
In return, the City promised to offer electricity, to not prohibit occupiers from setting up tents and 
staying overnight, and to indefinitely reserve the plaza for Occupy Philadelphia in case other 
groups, such as the Tea Party, applied to do an event. 
 
 
Because of its directly democratic nature, the Occupy General Assembly devoted several 
meetings to discussing how to respond to the city.  After several days, the group voted to sign a 
permit with no expiration date.52  As soon as the permit issue was resolved, however, a new set of 
demands came from the city.  These took the form of a letter from the office of Managing 
Director Richard Negrin dated October 11th—a mere six days into the occupation.53  The letter 
                                                          
52
See Jazelle Jones, Managing Director’s Office, City of Philadelphia, Pa., Permit Authorizing the Daily 
Occupation of Dilworth Plaza (Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/68947908/Occupy-Philly-Permit 
(showing that when the city returned the completed permit, the end date read “Start of Dilworth Plaza Construction-
TBD”). 
53
See Letter from Richard Negrin, Managing Dir., City of Philadelphia, Pa. to Jodi Dodd, Occupy Philly 
(Oct. 11, 2011), available at https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=246546462060092&set=a.245914445456627. 
52268.244736802241058&type=1&theater (displaying the letter, which was posted to the OP Legal Collective Facebook 
page for all to read). 
Figure 11: Map of Occupy Philly encampment at Dilworth Plaza.  Image courtesy of Occupy Philly Media.  
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began on a laudatory note, invoking Philadelphia’s history as the birthplace of free speech.  For 
Negrin, it was therefore significant that “the relationship between organizers and the city is being 
heralded as a national model on how to celebrate free speech in an effective manner.”54  However, 
the next paragraph told Occupy Philadelphia that a team of inspectors from the Department of 
License and Inspections toured the camp the previous day and had a series of safety “concerns” 
for Occupy Philadelphia to address, including: 
Removal of all combustibles near the building (specifically a pallet structure 
built for the homeless against the wall of City Hall) 
Removal of items from stairs, landings, and walkways (including all signs and 
banners) 
Remove any tent fixtures attached to trees and rails55 
Additional covering for the tech tent 
Procurement of portable toilets 
The letter also claimed that Occupy Philadelphia was causing problems with public 
urination, litter, and minor graffiti.  It warned against the use of generators, requested that Occupy 
Philadelphia schedule weekly meetings with the city, and reminded the group that they would be 
asked to vacate the plaza for planned construction in November.  The tone returned to congenial 
at the close and even went so far as to suggest setting up a collaborative Mural Arts Program or 
Community Service Project. 
The letter caused instant controversy in Occupy Philadelphia, and the multiple points it 
insisted needed to be addressed led to many General Assembly discussions about how to respond.  
The warning about vacating in November also sparked new discussions about whether to move or 
wait to be evicted.  On October 30th, after several weeks of intense discussions, Occupy 
Philadelphia produced a response to the city emphasizing the social and economic grievances 
Occupy Philadelphia had been addressing, requesting that the City reduce the number of police 
monitoring the encampment, suggesting ways that Occupy Philadelphia would handle security 
and sanitation issues, and condemning the $50 million development plan for Dilworth Plaza.56  
However, difficulties with the City did not end there. 
E. “Who Do You Serve? Who Do You Protect?”57: Demonstrations and Arrests 
While Occupy Philadelphia was negotiating terms with the City, they continued to hold 
                                                          
54
Id. 
55
The city’s emphasis on not damaging the plaza’s trees, rails, fixtures, and other structures seemed odd to 
Occupy Philadelphia participants given the fact the city planned to raze the plaza and everything on it as soon as they left. 
56
See Occupy Philly, @OccupyPhilly Letter to City of Philadelphia (Oct. 30, 2011, 11:59 PM), available at 
https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=133631820073027 (displaying the full text of the OP letter, which was made 
available at the Occupy Philadelphia Community Facebook page). 
57
This is a common chant directed at police when they interfere with protests. 
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frequent marches, demonstrations, and direct actions, which targeted banks, corporations, and 
policies that perpetuated inequality.  In the beginning, the police did not initiate any arrests.  
Instead, they worked with organizers to plan demonstrations.  They blocked streets for marches 
and even allowed protestors to change routes mid-march.  The first arrests did not take place until 
more than two weeks into Occupy Philadelphia, when a group of fifteen demonstrators staged a 
sit-in in front of Philadelphia Police Headquarters (known as the Roundhouse) for the National 
Day of Protest Against Police Brutality.58  Although the police gave several dispersal orders, the 
protestors refused to move until the police and the City responded to their list of demands, which 
included apologies for those who were victims of police violence and redress for policies such as 
stop and frisk.  Rather than arresting the demonstrators, police allowed them to sit in the street all 
night long, and waited until late the next morning to detain and charge them.59  The action 
received only lukewarm support from Occupy Philadelphia; targeting the police for the first act of 
civil disobedience confused many occupiers, especially since Philly police had been so 
cooperative up until that point. 
 
 
 
 
 
More arrests occurred in the following weeks.  Occupy Philadelphia-planned actions 
involving civil disobedience took place at the Comcast Building,60 Wells Fargo,61 and on the 
Market Street Bridge.62  The response of police to these actions followed the same pattern: 
                                                          
58
See Randy LoBasso, Occupy Philly Protesters Acquitted of Obstructing Highway, PHILLY NOW (Feb. 23, 
2012), http://blogs.philadelphiaweekly.com/phillynow/2012/02/23/occupy-philly-protesters-acquitted-of-obstructing-
highway/. 
59
See Suzy Subways, We’re Sitting-In at Police HQ: Words from the Street, OCCUPY PHILLY MEDIA  (Oct. 
23, 2011, 5:23 AM), http://occupyphillymedia.org/content/why-were-sitting-police-hq-words-street (providing a full 
account of the incident, as described by a local activist). 
60
See Reity O’Brien, Ten Arrested in Occupy Protest at Comcast Center, PHILLY.COM (November 2, 
2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-11-02/news/30350636_1_protest-comcast-tower-comcast-corp. 
61
See David Henry, More Occupy Arrests at Wells Fargo Bank, 6ABC.COM (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=8437703. 
62
See Alexandra Wigglesworth, Twenty-Four Arrests Made at Occupy Philly Market Street Bridge Sit-In, 
METRO (Nov. 17, 2011, 7:37 PM), http://www.metro.us/philadelphia/local/article/1027808--24-arrests-made-at-occupy-
Figure 12: Philadelphia police and protestors at a 
demonstration against Comcast that took place 
during a solidarity march with Occupy Oakland on 
November 2, 2011.  Photo courtesy of Dave Onion.  
Used with permission.  
Figure 13: Police surround protestors staging a 
sit-in on the Market Street Bridge.  Photo 
courtesy of Occupy Philly Media. 
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surround the civil disobedience protestors and separate them from the rest of the demonstration, 
bring in large numbers of reinforcements to outnumber protestors,63 give a series of dispersal 
orders to the protestors risking arrest, and then slowly and theatrically arrest the demonstrators 
one by one, cuffing them and escorting them to waiting police vans.  The entire process could 
take hours, even when fewer than a dozen were arrested.  After the arrests were complete and the 
vans left the site, Occupy Philadelphia demonstrators generally returned to the encampment 
without incident. 
During Occupy Wall Street, police abuse led to increased interest and participation in the 
movement.  In Philadelphia, police were scrupulous in avoiding actions that might be perceived as 
extreme or controversial.  Nevertheless, events at other occupations often acted as catalysts for 
Occupy Philadelphia actions.  The Comcast demonstration, for example, was a direct response to 
the extreme violence against Occupy Oakland that had taken place the previous day.64  Images of 
nonviolent protestors being shot, tear gassed, pepper sprayed, and forcibly evicted in NYC, 
Oakland, Portland, Denver, Boston, and other cities reminded Occupy Philadelphia that police 
violence was also a very real possibility in Philadelphia.  Without a local police crackdown, 
protestors and police entered a tense standoff.  Tensions became exacerbated as November arrived 
and the threat of eviction became an increasing possibility. 
F. “You Can’t Evict an Idea Whose Time Has Come!” 65: Occupy Philadelphia Eviction 
and Aftermath 
Concerns about the fate of the encampment multiplied at the beginning of November 
when the city began to insist that Occupy Philadelphia leave Dilworth Plaza and apply for a 
permit for Thomas Paine Plaza across the street.  A series of Occupy evictions across the 
country—and especially the violent removal of Occupy Wall Street from Zuccotti Park on 
November 15th—added to the air of fear and uncertainty.  Articles circulating on the Internet 
suggesting a conspiracy of mayors coordinating a nationwide crackdown on the movement did 
little to assuage the increasing anxieties of Occupy Philadelphia participants.66  Despite worries 
about eviction, Occupy Philadelphia decided (after many weeks of General Assemblies, 
discussions, votes, and listserv exchanges) to hold Dilworth Plaza. 
                                                          
philly-market-street-bridge-sit-in. 
63
The sheer amount of officers deployed to arrest small groups of peaceful protestors and the constant 
monitoring of the encampment by police meant the city was spending an enormous amount of money each day to pay 
officers, a fact they did not hesitate to remind the public through the media. See, e.g., Bob Warner, Occupy Philadelphia 
Costs City $400,000 in Police Surveillance, PHILLY.COM (Oct. 12, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-10-
12/news/30271358_1_demonstration-protest-police-costs. 
64
The violent police raid at Occupy Oakland used tear gas and projectile weapons to fire on protestors, 
leaving an Iraq War veteran with a fractured skull and prompting the Oakland General Assembly to call for a general 
strike, which brought over 30,000 people into the streets.  See Oakland Police Critically Injure Scott Olsen, Iraq War Vet, 
During ‘Occupy’ March, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/10/26/oakland-police-critically_n_1033430.html. 
65
This phrase was first used during the Occupy Wall Street eviction, and became a rallying cry at 
occupations across the country. 
66
See Naomi Wolf, The Shocking Truth About the Crackdown on Occupy, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2011, 
12:25 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/nov/25/shocking-truth-about-crackdown-occupy 
(arguing that the “crackdown on protesters” in different cities was coordinated). 
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Following his easy re-election on November 8th,67 Mayor Nutter began to issue a series 
of letters and press releases condemning Occupy Philadelphia for not attending to the City’s 
growing list of demands, requests, and concerns.68  Drawing on the language of labor solidarity, 
he also accused Occupy Philadelphia of blocking workers with contracts for the construction 
project—now referred to as “a project built by the 99% for the 99%.”69  At this point, a small 
group united by their disagreement about the General Assembly’s vote to hold Dilworth Plaza and 
calling themselves Reasonable Solutions split off from Occupy Philadelphia.  This group arranged 
a private meeting with city and police officials, who were happy to find Occupy Philadelphia 
participants with whom they could negotiate.  Under external and internal pressure to re-locate, 
Occupy Philadelphia decided at one spirited General Assembly to move the camp immediately to 
Thomas Paine Plaza, and worked in groups to carry materials and tents across the street.  They 
were turned back almost immediately by police threatening arrests if the move continued.  After a 
long discussion, demonstrators returned to Dilworth Plaza.  When the General Assembly decided 
to apply for a permit for Thomas Paine shortly thereafter, the city responded with a restrictive 
permit that denied overnight camping and permanent structures.  Occupy Philadelphia refused, 
and settled in for the seemingly inevitable eviction. 
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See Elections 2011, NBC10 PHILADELPHIA (Nov. 9, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/ 
news/elections/2011/races/race-results/ (reporting the victory of Michael Nutter for the November 2011 Philadelphia 
mayoral race with 75% of the votes). 
68
See Mayor Nutter Raises Public Health and Safety Concerns Related to Occupy Philly, Increases Police 
Protection, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA (Nov. 14, 2011, 8:56 AM), http://cityofphiladelphia.wordpress.com/ 
2011/11/14/mayor-nutter-raises-public-health-and-safety-concerns-related-to-occupy-philly-increases-police-protection/ 
(displaying Mayor Nutter’s press release of November 13, 2011, relating to public health and safety concerns regarding 
the Occupy Philadelphia site on Dilworth Plaza). 
69
Kia Gregory, Mayor: Occupy Philly Must Move By Sunday, PHILLY.COM (Nov. 25, 2011), 
http://articles.philly.com/2011-11-25/news/30441377_1_mayor-nutter-relocation-activists. 
Figure 14: Notice to vacate Dilworth 
Plaza posted by the City of 
Philadelphia.  Photo by author.  
Figure 15: “Reoccupy Philly” poster 
circulated in the days leading up to the 
eviction.  Photo courtesy of Occupy Philly 
Media.
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The first formal eviction notice came on November 15th in the form of a bright yellow 
flier posted all around the Occupy Philadelphia encampment.  Announcing that the planned 
construction was “imminent,” it advised occupiers to “take the opportunity to vacate Dilworth 
Plaza and remove all personal belongings immediately.”  This notice was quickly followed by an 
official press release from the Mayor ordering Occupy Philadelphia to leave the plaza.70  When 
the eviction notice appeared, organizers created and disseminated a flier outlining plans to 
“Reoccupy Philly” in case of a police raid and advising participants to reassemble the following 
day at Rittenhouse Park.71  A rapid- response Twitter account was also created to alert participants 
about eviction news.  However, because no date was given for the eviction, the days dragged on 
and everyone waited in nervous anticipation for the inevitable confrontation.  On November 25th, 
the Mayor finally gave Occupy Philadelphia the deadline of 5:00 p.m. on Sunday November 27th 
to leave the plaza.72  Protestors rallied to City Hall on Sunday afternoon and, by 5:00 p.m., 
thousands were gathered to defend the encampment.  Roughly one hundred demonstrators sat on 
the front steps of the plaza, determined to stay there until the last dispersal order was given.  
When I finally turned over my legal observing hat to the next shift seven hours later, no police 
had shown up.  As the hour grew late, the crowd thinned.  There were only a few dozen people on 
the steps the next morning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70
See Mayor Nutter Raises Public Health and Safety Concerns Related to Occupy Philly, Increases Police 
Protection, supra note 68. 
71
Rittenhouse is a large park in the heart of Center City’s shopping, restaurant, and tourist district.  The 
park was chosen as a location for the occupation for its symbolic value as a place for the 1%. 
72
See LaInteligentsia, Mayor’s Press Release Requesting Protesters Vacate Dilworth Plaza, OCCUPY 
PHILLY MEDIA, (Nov. 16, 2011, 5:48 PM), http://occupyphillymedia.org/content/mayors-press-release-requesting-
protesters-vacate-dilworth-plaza (containing the full text of the eviction press release). 
Figure 16: Protestors gathered to defend the plaza at the announced eviction 
time. Hundreds assembled that night, while only a fraction remained the 
following morning.  Photo courtesy of Dave Onion.  Used with permission.  
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Although many people remained at the plaza day and night to be prepared for the 
eviction, Monday and Tuesday passed with no incidents.  When the police did move in at 1:00 
a.m. on the cold and rainy night of Wednesday November 30th, they were met with an exhausted 
gathering that was much smaller than the boisterous crowd that had assembled on Sunday.  The 
night of the eviction, police tactics were far more aggressive than they had been previously.  
Hundred of cops in riot gear encircled the plaza, using batons, bicycles, horses, helicopters, and 
the spectacle of empty city buses (presumably to be filled with those arrested) to create a 
threatening display for any demonstrators who were thinking about defying the eviction.  After 
removing everyone from the plaza, police allowed protestors to march through the mostly empty 
streets for the next few hours.  Eventually, they shut down the impromptu demonstration by 
surrounding and mass arresting an arbitrary group of fifty-five protestors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next day, occupiers attending the meeting at Rittenhouse Square were met by 
approximately one hundred police officers, who surrounded the park as well as several other 
possible “re-location” options.  The few hundred demonstrators who gathered were allowed to 
enter the park, hold a General Assembly, and then march to the Roundhouse for jail solidarity.  
However, any plans to re-occupy another space that day never came to fruition.  But while the 
Occupy encampment was over, Occupy Philadelphia is not.  As inother cities, participants moved 
indoors for the winter to plan for a spring offensive, which included a nation-wide General Strike 
on May 1st, protests against the NATO summit in Chicago in May, and an Occupy National 
Gathering in Philadelphia in early July.  Lawyers and legal workers need to learn from the 
mistakes of the occupations to help protestors navigate the next round of the struggle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Police in riot gear were transported 
to City Hall on buses on the night of the 
eviction.  Photo courtesy of Dave Onion.  Used 
with permission.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
While more conciliatory and less violent than police reactions in locations like New 
York and Oakland, the Negotiated Management tactics of the City of Philadelphia and the 
Philadelphia Police Department often succeeded in hindering the growth and effectiveness of the 
movement.  While an open and direct display of force would have likely increased participation in 
the movement, the City’s emphasis on permit issues, code violations, and bureaucratic 
procedures—combined with a well-executed media strategy of slowly discrediting 
demonstrators—caused serious problems for the local movement in terms of growth, public 
support, and legal defense. 
Delaying and distracting protestors with permits and code violations, tightly managing 
each demonstration, taking advantage of dissent in the Occupy Philadelphia ranks, using the 
construction plans as a way to re-fashion Occupy Philadelphia into a less threatening entity, 
presenting negative portrayals of the encampment and its organizers, and drawing out the eviction 
until protestors were literally exhausted all worked to ensure that there was very little backlash 
when the City and police finally evicted the camp.  Negative press initiated by the Mayor’s office 
prior to the eviction depicted the encampment as unsanitary and unsafe, and accused organizers of 
not following through on their end of negotiations with the City and police.  As a result, public 
support gradually dwindled.  Though many remained sympathetic to the goals of Occupy 
Philadelphia, very few were willing to defend the encampment or take another space.  By the time 
of the eviction, many participants had faded away from the movement confused and irritated by 
the endless General Assembly discussions about how to deal with the City.  Meanwhile, 
organizers who had spent countless hours working to build and defend the encampment burned 
out from stress and lack of rest.  Cold weather, illness, and growing internal disagreements also 
contributed to the movement’s decline. 
Figure 18: Hundreds of police surrounded City Hall 
after removing protestors, who assembled across the 
street to watch as remaining tents and other 
materials were destroyed and cleared form the 
plaza.  Photo courtesy of Occupy Philly Media.  
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On the legal front, the City and police actions did not allow supportive lawyers from the 
NLG and ACLU much room to maneuver.  While attorneys in other cities were successful in 
attaining preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders to stave off evictions, in 
Philadelphia the previously planned construction and the City’s offer of Thomas Paine Plaza as an 
alternative site made it difficult to turn staying at Dilworth into a First Amendment case.  
Consequently, the work of movement support lawyers, legal workers, and law students focused on 
helping protestors with permitting issues, sending legal observers to demonstrations, and 
providing attorneys for those arrested. 
What lessons can lawyers and legal workers learn from these case studies?  In hindsight, 
it becomes obvious that both Occupy Philadelphia organizers and the lawyers and legal workers 
coordinating legal defense were far more prepared for an Escalated Force response.  This is not 
surprising, given the memories of the last large protest in Philly (the 2000 Republican National 
Convention) and the evidence of extreme force used against Occupy Wall Street in New York.  
As a result, our legal infrastructure prioritized setting up an arrest hotline and support office, 
having legal observers constantly present to monitor police interactions with protestors, training 
more legal observers for expected confrontations, assembling a list of defense attorneys willing to 
represent arrested protestors, and preparing and conducting Know Your Rights workshops for 
occupiers.  All of these tasks were necessary precautions.  However, in the end, we did not find 
ourselves dealing with mass arrests and numerous explicit civil rights violations.  Unfortunately, 
we did not spend nearly enough time or effort advising protestors how to handle the more 
complicated tactics inherent in the Negotiated Management approach. 
An important lesson moving forward is to remember that legal experts are well placed to 
constantly assess the tactics of government officials and police and to have explicit conversations 
about what combination of strategies are being deployed and how to deal with them most 
effectively.  We cannot assume how local officials will respond to protest. Instead legal activists 
must anticipate the use of escalated force, negotiated management, a combination of the two 
approaches, or new tactics of which we are not currently aware.  Activists and legal support need 
to work together to ensure that the conversation stays on the issues that define the movement 
instead of becoming bogged down in bureaucratic negotiations with City and police officials.  We 
need to use our expertise in the law and police strategy to help protestors navigate the hurdles of 
permits, code violations, mass arrests, and government bureaucracy without losing sight of the 
ultimate objective—to further the struggle for economic and social justice. 
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